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A B S T R A C T
The purpose of this article is to explore the development of Russian military spending in
light of weak and negative growth of the Russian economy and to look at the reasons for
the economic decline that has developed after the economic crisis in 2009 and is due to
long-term internal structural factors that have existed since the mid-2000s. The conﬁ-
dence crisis resulting from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine 2014, Western sanctions and
falling oil prices has further aggravated these tendencies and the economy is now con-
tracting. The main conclusions are that the share of the defense budget in GDP has risen
substantially, but there is still a trade-off between defense and other public spending in
the budget. Political reformwould be necessary to implement market institutions and revive
the economy.
Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University.
1. Introduction
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and the in-
tensiﬁed economic decline that followed have changed the
conditions for Russian military spending. For a decade Rus-
sia’s geopolitical ambitions have been reﬂected in increased
defense spending. Since the economic crisis in 2009,
however, Russia has experienced low growth for several
years; in 2015 it is facing a substantial contraction of GDP,
and growth prospects are weak for the foreseeable future.
It follows that continuing to give high priority to defense
will become more costly in terms of other public spend-
ing. How far is Russia ready to go in giving precedence to
defense over other public expenditure under these new cir-
cumstances? Will the high level of defense spending be
maintained or will it be adapted to the new economic
conditions?
Russia’s military expenditure became increasingly note-
worthy as it rose in the 2000s, and it became even more
relevant to study its development as Russia started to chal-
lenge the new security order in Europe that had been formed
after the end of the Cold War. In his speech to the Feder-
ation Council on 25 April 2005, President Vladimir Putin
(2005) claimed that “the collapse of the Soviet Union was
amajor geopolitical disaster of the century”. Two years later,
in his address to the Munich Conference on Security Policy
he described the unipolar world that developed after the
Cold War with the US as the only superpower as “unac-
ceptable” (Putin, 2007). The war with Georgia in 2008made
it clear that Russia’s geopolitical ambitions were real and
not just slogans for an audience at home.1 It showed that
Russia was ready to use force to protect its “sphere of in-
ﬂuence”. A military reform was introduced in 2008 aiming
at modernizing the Armed Forces and giving them a “New
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Look”,2 thereby building contemporary military capability
in terms of both advanced technology and professional per-
sonnel. The reform signaled that the defense budget would
continue to be a priority and also that the leadership was
opting for more capability per ruble spent. In support of the
reform, a new ten-year state armament program was
launched in 2011, which aimed at rearming the Armed
Forces with up-to-date arms and support systems up to
2020.3 The armament program led to yearly arms procure-
ment rising as share of GDP, and concerns about cost-
eﬃciency and value for money became more pronounced
in the Ministry of Defense’s procurement policy.4
The purpose of this article is to explore the develop-
ment of Russian military spending in light of the changed
economic situation and also to look at the reasons for the
economic decline that has developed after the economic
crisis in 2009. Attempts to modernize the economy have
failed, which is due to a number of long-term internal struc-
tural factors that have existed since the mid-2000s. The
conﬁdence crisis resulting from Russia’s aggression against
Ukraine, Western sanctions and falling oil prices has further
aggravated these tendencies and the crisis.
The article starts by investigating the economic situa-
tion and military expenditure up to 2013 (section 2). In this
section the factors behind the rise in the defense budget
since 2011 are explored. The third section analyzes the long-
term reasons for Russia’s weak economic growth after the
economic crisis in 2009. Section 4 discusses Putin’s eco-
nomic policy after he came back to the presidency in 2012.
In section 5 economic policy and defense spending after
2013 are discussed, including the amendments to the orig-
inal federal budget law for 2015 that were made in early
2015. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2. Military expenditure and economic growth
up to 2013
Over the ten-year period starting in 2003, Russia’s mil-
itary expenditure doubled, and in 2013 Russia was the third
largest country in terms of military spending in the world,
with annual expenditure of USD 88 billion and a sizable
share of GDP – of 4.4 percent (SIPRI, 2014). This was on
par with the share of GDP of the USA but high in compar-
ison with the EU (27) countries’ average of about 2 percent
(e.g. France has 2.3 percent and the UK, 2.5 percent; SIPRI,
2014). In value terms Russia’s defense spending was now
considerably higher than that of France (USD 61 billion)
and the UK (USD 58 billion), countries whosemilitary spend-
ing was twice as high as Russia’s ten years earlier (SIPRI,
2014). Over just a decade Russia had managed to
substantially enlarge its defense budget, a strategic pre-
condition for developing its military strength, for further
reform of the Armed Forces and for pursuing the geopolit-
ical agenda.
Figure 1 shows the GDP shares of military expenditure
for Russia and the EU (27) countries in accordance with
SIPRI’s data which are based on a common deﬁnition, which
allows international comparison. It also shows the GDP share
of the Russian defense budget which is based on a more
narrow deﬁnition than SIPRI’s. The defense budget is the
magnitude used in the discussions of allocations in the
federal budget.
A fundamental condition for the increase in Russia’s mil-
itary spending was its exceptionally high economic growth
during the 2000s. Yearly average growth between 2000 and
2008was 6.9 percent, a growth rate only challenged by China
(10.4 percent) and India (6.7 percent) among the develop-
ing and emerging economies (IMF 2014; Kudrin and Gurvich,
2015: 4). During the later period, 2009–2013, including the
ﬁnancial crisis, Russia’s average growth was 1 percent, those
of China and India 8.9 and 7.0 percent respectively (IMF
2014). The high growth rate in the ﬁrst period was due to
the economic reforms in the 1990s that led to structural
change, productivity increases, integration with Europe and
the rise in the oil price from an average of USD 19.60/bbl5
in the 1990s to almost USD 150/bbl before the dip in 2008.
After that oil prices increased again, but growth did not pick
up as expected after 2009–2010; instead it declined
gradually.
Taking the 2000s as a whole, the Russian economy grew
at an average rate of 6 percent per year, and so did the
defense budget, with a fairly stable share of GDP of around
2.7 percent. Russia’s total military expenditure according
to SIPRI’s deﬁnition amounted to about 4 percent of GDP
during this period of high growth.
In 2011, when the military reform was introduced, the
defense budget rose to 2.9 percent of GDP and the three-
year budget for 2012–2014 anticipated an increase to 3.2
percent of GDP in 2012, to 3.7 in 2013 and to 3.9 percent
in 2014 (Oxenstierna & Bergstrand, 2012, 63). The actual
result for 2012 was a defense budget of 2.9 percent of GDP,
thus lower than planned, and in the three-year budget for
2013–2015, the defense budget’s share of GDP had been
lowered to 3.1 of GDP for 2013. The shares of 2014 and 2015
were maintained at high levels of 3.8 and 3.5 percent re-
spectively (Oxenstierna, 2013, p. 116).
2.1. Factors behind the increase in the defense budget
On the cost side several factors have affected the size of
the defense budget. The main reason is the state arma-
ment program for 2011–2020, the increased personnel costs
due to a higher share of contract soldiers is another, and
ﬁnally the need to modernize the unreformed defense in-
dustry represent three major factors. The new armament
program caused the yearly state defense orders
(gosudarstvennyi oboronnyi zakaz, GOZ) to rise steeply, and
this presented challenges to the existing procurement system
2 “Novyi Oblik”. For an account of the military reform in 2008–2011, see
Carlsson and Norberg (2012, pp. 97–111).
3 The state armament program for the period 2011–2020. RUR 19 tril-
lion were to be spent and as a result 70 percent of the armed forces’ arms
were to be modern by 2020 (Oxenstierna & Westerlund, 2013, p. 2).
4 Over the ten-year period 2000–2010 arms procurement as a percent-
age of GDP rose from 0.7 to 1 percent. With the new state armament
program that share would double to 2 percent up to 2014. Then Defense
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov challenged the industry over prices and opened
it up for competition from abroad (Oxenstierna & Bergstrand, 2012, pp.
50–51). 5 In constant 1999 USD, bbl = barrels of oil.
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which then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov
started to address in order improve cost-eﬃciency in
procurement.6
2.2. The state armament program 2011–2020
The main factor behind the rise in the defense budget
for 2012–2014 was the new state armament program
(gosudarsvennaya programma vooruzhenii, GPV) 2011–
2020, which doubled the yearly procurement budget of the
Ministry of Defense between 2011 and 2013, and planned
high levels for subsequent years resulting in arms procure-
ment at 2 percent of GDP by 2014 (Oxenstierna & Bergstrand,
2012, 49, 51). The military objective behind this cost in-
crease is that by 2020, 70 percent of the Armed Forces’ arms
were to be modern.
With Vladimir Putin back in the presidency in 2012, the
GPV and the defense industry received strong support.
Among the ﬁrst actions taken by Putin (2012a) after his
inauguration was his signing Decree No. 603 on the mod-
ernization of the defense industry and setting the pace for
the realization of the GPV 2020. Later the same year, in his
budget address to the Federation Council, Putin (2012d) an-
nounced that the Russian defense industry should be a driver
in economic development. In 2013, the government
economic program stated that the technological
modernization of the defense sector should be
accelerated. It planned for increased GOZ and special in-
vestment programs for the defense industry (Government,
2013, 23).
Of the total budget for procurement of the GPV 2020,
RUR 19,000 billion were reserved for theMinistry of Defense
and between 2011 and 2020 as much as 80 percent of the
total will be spent on purchases of arms, while 10 percent
is set aside for research and development (R&D) and 10
percent for repair and upgrading of older equipment
(Oxenstierna &Westerlund, 2013, 5). Table 1 shows the al-
location of the Ministry of Defense GPV’s aggregate funds
by major functions in the Ministry of Defense program. The
Military Space Forces, Aerospace Defense Forces (ASD), Air
Force and Navy would get the lion’s share of the funds. In
addition, the government planned investment to modern-
ize the defense industry and has issued several Federal Target
Programs (FTPs) for this purpose (Westerlund, 2012). The
Ministry of Defense website (2013b) gave the yearly targets
(in percentages of the totals) for achieving this within dif-
ferent types of arms. As noted by Barabanov, Makienko, and
Pukhov (2013, 19), almost 75 percent of the costs are
planned to fall in the period after 2015.
It is already a tradition that before the full period of one
ten-year GPV has elapsed, a new one is developed and
launched, which makes it diﬃcult to assess to what degree
these programs are fulﬁlled. Not surprisingly, during the
present GPV, the new GPV for 2015–2025 was developed,
and some deliveries will be postponed. The ﬁrst oﬃcial sign
of this procedure was an agreement between the Ministry
of Finance and the Ministry of Defense of 22 May 2013. The
6 An account of the organizational and economic problems of the pro-
curement system see Oxenstierna (2013, pp. 113–115). See also Malmlöf
et al. (2013, pp. 127–136) for an assessment of what has been delivered.
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Minister of Finance, Anton Siluanov, proposed to post-
pone parts of the GPV 2020 for between two and four years
due to the expected fall in budget revenues, causing a higher
budget deﬁcit, and because the Ministry of Finance must
ﬁnd an additional RUR 1.3 trillion over the period 2013–
2016 to fund infrastructural investments prioritized by
President Putin (Vedomosti, 2013a, 2013b). The substan-
tial increases in the military budget compared to other
budget items over several years constituted an additional
argument (Kommersant, 2013a). The cuts appear to have
been accepted by theMinister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, who
made reference to the procurement plans being overopti-
mistic and noted that delays in contracting were already
causing delays in production. In July, Vedomosti (2013a) re-
ported that theMinistry of Defense had accepted postponing
RUR 87 billion of the GPV, which would be spent in 2014–
2016 instead. In addition, the Ministry of Finance proposed
to cut the funding of the GPV in general by 5 percent per
year over the period 2014–2016 in an attempt to cut all state
procurement.7 Moreover, Shoigumade cuts in foreign orders
for defense equipment; for instance, an order for 1275 Iveco
LMV-65 light multi-role vehicles was cancelled in Decem-
ber 2012 (Kommersant, 2013b).
Shoigu thus opted for a less confrontational approach
(compared to Serdyukov) toward the industry by demon-
strating greater ﬂexibility on terms and pricing and promises
that future contracts would be awarded primarily to do-
mestic ﬁrms (CSIS, 2015). Nevertheless, in 2012, it was still
foreseen that limited amounts of foreign equipment would
be purchased for experimentation and to spur domestic
manufacturers, since the Russian defense industry could not
match the technologies produced in theWest (The Telegraph,
2012).
2.3. The defense industry
The loss-making companies in the Russian defense in-
dustry are obviously a strong lobbying power in the Russian
military establishment and they continue to get funding and
soft credits to cover their losses in exchange for loyalty to
the political leadership. Former Defense Minister Anatoly
Serdyukov tried to introduce some eﬃciency into this
system. However, his economic approach to procurement
and outsourcing of non-military functions led to his fall.
Instead, Putin promised continued subsidies and received
substantial support from the big defense companies in his
election campaign in 2011–2012. Yet keeping the old com-
panies alive comes at a cost. The Audit Chamber noted in
its report to the Duma Defense Committee in 2012 that 30
percent of the defense industrial companies were loss-
making and that using state credits in the GOZ preserved
this unproﬁtable structure (VPK, 2013). Only 20 percent of
the companies were deemed to be in such a shape that they
could be modernized. The remaining 50 percent were as-
sessed to be in such a bad state that it would bemeaningless
to restructure them; instead it would be better to set up new
companies and replace them (VPK, 2013).
The use of state-guaranteed credits in the GOZ is another
way of perpetuating cost ineﬃciencies and inhibiting pro-
ductivity improvements in the defense industry. As shown
byCooper (2012), asmuchas22percent of theGOZ for 2011–
2015 was funded from such credits. State credits that are
fully backed by the government are very similar to direct
allocations. The maneuvering between the Ministry of
Finance and theMinistry of Defense in 2013 suggested that
credits and budget assignmentswere, in fact, the same kind
of money for the companies since the state even pays the
interest rate on credits (Vedomosti, 2013a, 2013b). If state-
guaranteed credits are to supplement direct budget
allocations, expenditure on the GPV becomes higher than
what thebudgetﬁgures so far have revealed, since the federal
budget excludes extra-budgetary spending (spending funded
from other sources outside the budget). Apparently, the use
of state guarantees in the GOZ has become costly, and in
the federal budget for 2015–2017 the state guarantees for
the GOZ had been abolished (Cooper, 2014).
How far the GOZ is implemented and arms are deliv-
ered is diﬃcult to assess, not least because the breakdown
of each yearly GOZ has been secret, although in recent years
the GOZ has becomemore transparent regarding its volume
and breakdown into new equipment, renovation and
7 This proposal was not accepted at the time, but in the new budget pro-
posal for 2015, the defense allocation has been cut; see Table 4.
Table 1
Allocation of funds in the Ministry of Defense GPV 2020.
Programme Key objectives and indicators Funding;
trillion RUR
Total MoD GPV 2020
of which:
The share of modern weapons and military equipment supplied to the Armed
Forces should be 30% in 2016 and 70% in 2020.
19.0
Strategic nuclear forces The share of modern weapons should be 75–80% in 2020. More than 400 land-
based and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles; 8 missile strategic
submarine cruisers.
1.0
Military Space Forces and
Aerospace Defence Forces (ASD)
The share of modern weapons in ASD in 2020 shall be at least 70%; about 100
spacecraft and 28 S-400 regimental units.
4.0
Air Force More than 600 aircraft and over 1,000 helicopters. 4.7
General-purpose Navy forces 51 surface warships. 16 attack submarines. 90 support vessels. 4.4
Ground troops and Airborne troops 10 Iskander-M regimental units. 9 S-300V4 regimental units. About 2,000 self-
propelled guns. More than 30,000 vehicles.
2.6
Main departments of the MOD The share of modern rear and special equipment shall be at least 65% in 2020. 2.3
Source: Gaidar Institute (2013, p. 512).
Note: The Ministry of Defense GPV is the part of the state armament program that is for the Ministry of Defense.
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modernization (Malmlöf, Roffey, & Vendil Pallin, 2013, 127).
Actual deliveries are also diﬃcult to assess since informa-
tion is scattered and analyses are usually based on results
reported by the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strat-
egies and Technologies (CAST) and reports in Russian
newspapers. Oxenstierna andWesterlund (2013, pp. 19–24)
have attempted to assess the deliveries for the GPV 2020
up to 2011. They concluded that orders for Sineva SLBMs,
MiG ﬁghter aircraft, helicopters, diesel-electric subma-
rines and lorries were likely to be met (Oxenstierna &
Westerlund, 2013, p. 23). However, on the basis of an as-
sessment of defense industry performance, they found it
unlikely that the GPV 2020 would be fully achieved. More-
over they point out that large producers have diﬃculty
developing production capacity and serial production, and
that even in the strategic missile and air defense sector com-
panies have had trouble coping with orders (Oxenstierna
& Westerlund, 2013, p. 20). Malmlöf et al. (2013, pp.
127–133) compare known deliveries in six branches of ar-
maments in 2011–2012, with the goals of the GPV 2020.
Due to the incompleteness of the data, the authors cannot
draw far-reaching conclusions but among their ﬁndings are
that for ﬁxed-wing aircraft only half of orders in 2011 were
fulﬁlled, and in 2012 two-thirds; all contracts for helicop-
ters were fulﬁlled; but the production of new submarines
has been fraught with diﬃculties (Malmlöf et al., 2013).
2.4. Personnel costs
In 2013, Russia entered a period of a sharp decline in the
working-age population, and the cohorts of young men of
conscription age are small. In the next ten years, the cohorts
of 18-year-olds will number below 700,000 a year, and at
times the number will be down to ,00 (Oxenstierna, 2013,
pp. 109–111). Putin’s (2012c) Decree No. 604 on military
service requires that the number of contract soldiers should
rise by 50,000 per year up to 2018. This boost is a reaction
to the shortage of conscripts. The Ministry of Defense
(2013b) has published its plans for manning on its website,
and Table 2 shows what this will entail for the numbers of
contract and conscript soldiers up to 2020.8
Having a higher proportion of contract soldiers in-
creases costs. Using the information on military wages and
planned personnel gathered by the Gaidar Institute and pre-
sented in Oxenstierna and Bergstrand (2012, p. 55), it can
be seen that cutting the number of conscripts by 300,000
per year, and replacing them with contracted personnel,
would increase the yearly total wage fund by about 40
percent as compared to the original calculations based on
700,000 conscripts. In 2012, the salaries and beneﬁts in the
Armed Forces were raised in accordance with a new law on
monetary beneﬁts (Oxenstierna and Bergstrand, 2012). The
Ministry of Finance estimated that the reform would cost
another 1 percent of GDP (Oxenstierna and Bergstrand,
2012). According to the Ministry of Defense (2013a), sala-
ries and beneﬁts have risen 2.5–3 times since the law was
adopted andwere on average RUR 23 000–35,000 permonth
in 2013. In July 2013, the Audit Chamber reported that the
Ministry of Defense had overspent on salaries by RUR 88
billion in 2012, due to the fact that the actual number of
individuals employed was 760,000 rather than 1 million,
which the budget for wages was based on (Izvestiya, 2013).
The same source estimates the share of personnel in total
defense costs at around 30 percent in 2012.
It may also be noted that, even with higher salaries, there
is no guarantee that the Ministry of Defense can ﬁnd all the
contract soldiers that are needed. The whole population in
the able-bodied age groups is shrinking and the Armed
Forces will have to compete with the civil labor market for
recruits (Oxenstierna, 2013, p. 105).
3. The reasons behind Russia’s economic decline
The decline of the Russian economy is due to a multi-
tude of factors and is not due just to the process that has
evolved since Vladimir Putin came back as president in
2012. The Russian economy has suffered from structural
problems since the early 2000s, and unfortunately the mod-
ernization program launched in 2009 by then President
Dmitry Medvedev – which addressed problems such as the
need for diversiﬁcation from the heavy reliance on the export
of hydrocarbons, too much state involvement in the
economy, the weak business climate for small andmedium-
sized businesses and corruption – was too much of a
challenge for the ruling political elites and never
materialized.9 Yet the popular protests in the fall of 2011
8 It may be noted that increasing the number of contract soldiers at the
pace suggested, and keeping the total target number, 1million, would entail
over 400,000 conscripts being needed every year up to 2016. This is hardly
realistic since in these years the cohorts are very small. Either the goal of
1 million men needs to be modiﬁed or other reserves need to be mobi-
lized. After 2016, the mix of 425,000 contract soldiers and 355,000
conscripts seems more achievable.
9 The modernization program “Russia, forward!” was launched in Sep-
tember 2009 (Medvedev, 2009, discussed in Oxenstierna, 2009, pp. 43–45).
Table 2
Planned personnel in the Armed Forces 2012–2020; thousand persons.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Oﬃcers 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
Contracted 244* 241 295 350 400 425 425 425 425
Conscripts 296 359* 435* 430* 380* 355* 355* 355* 355*
Total 760 820 950 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Planned manning level 800** 820 950 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Source: Ministry of Defense (2013b); see also Gaidar Institute (2013, p. 510); Oxenstierna and Bergstrand (2012, p. 55).
Notes: *Calculated residual. ** Planned 2012 (NVO, 2013).
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and early 2012 against electoral fraud, and against Putin’s
standing for president again, showed that a considerable part
of society wanted a change in the political sphere as well.
A big diﬃculty for any modernization program in Russia
is that the economic system that has developed since the
reforms in the 1990s still bears features of the Soviet
command system. Despite the change of system from a
command economy to a market economy, the institutions
that normally support market allocation are weak, and in
many ways they are overruled by the informal institu-
tions surviving from the Soviet era. That Russia’s institutions
are deﬁcient is reﬂected in the Worldwide Governance In-
dicators (WGI, 2014). TheWGI project constructs aggregate
indicators of six broad dimensions of governance: politi-
cal stability and absence of violence/terrorism; voice and
accountability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality;
rule of law; and control of corruption. When these indica-
tors are studied over time, it is found that in Russia they
have generally been low, that they improved up to the early
2000s, but that since 2004 there has been a marked dete-
rioration in vital institutions like “rule of law” and “control
over corruption” (Oxenstierna, 2014). “Voice and account-
ability” shows a downward trend over the whole period of
Putin’s leadership since 2000 (Oxenstierna, 2014). Weak in-
stitutions create scope for “manual management” of
economic matters, which is also a reason why institutions
need to be kept weak – so that political goals rather than
economic goals can be pursued. In fact Oxenstierna (2014)
concludes that growth cannot be restored within this eco-
nomic system.
The present Russian economic system may be charac-
terized as a hybrid of the old Soviet heritage with ineﬃcient
state-owned or state-controlled subsidized enterprises and
state intervention, on the one hand, and a market economy
consisting mainly of the small and medium-sized busi-
ness sector that evolved after the change of system, on the
other hand. In Putin’s power balancing system, the loss-
making “Soviet-type enterprises”10 are subsidized to ensure
continuing support for the regime. Rents from high oil prices
have been distributed in what Gaddy and Ickes (2010, 2015)
call a “rent management system”, and economic behavior
has been labeled “rent addiction” (Gaddy and Ickes, 2010,
2015), alluding to the fact that when rents from natural
resources are invested in ineﬃcient production by loss-
making ﬁrms – “addicts” – they will continue to demand
resources in order to save jobs and capital already in-
stalled. Oxenstierna (2015, pp. 101–102) argues that this
preservation of the old industrial structure and the result-
ing rent management system inhibits the growth of the
private market-oriented sector. It provides an explanation
for the weak institutional framework and poor business
climate in Russia. The old industrial sector is not inter-
ested in institutional reform and more competition;
“moremarket” would upset the power balance (Oxenstierna,
2015).
Nevertheless, liberal economists in Russia have argued
for a renewed market reform in order for Russia to be able
to compete in the global environment, overcome capacity
constraints and support innovation. They have also empha-
sized the need for real democracy to enable modernization
(Åslund, 2012, p. 382). However, the regime under Putin has
becomemore authoritarian and since he came back to power
in 2012, civil society has been repressed and civil liberties
have been severely restricted. Tax policies and anti-
corruption campaigns have had an adverse effect on the
establishment and growth of new businesses, and small
businesses have shut down or become part of the infor-
mal economy instead of expanding and increasing their
share in the formal economy. Without political reform it is
diﬃcult to see how performance of the economy could
improve (Oxenstierna, 2015).
For the European countries that were formerly part of
the Soviet bloc, the possibility of EU accession was seen as
an effective external anchor for structural reforms in the
1990s. Some observers considered that accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO)might support Russia’s im-
proving competition and its internal market (Tarr &
Volchkova, 2013). By joining theWTO in 2012, Russia com-
mitted itself to bringing its trade laws and practices into
compliance with WTO rules.11 However, the aggression
against Ukraine and the sanctions that followed appear to
have wiped out any type of beneﬁt that Russia could have
exploited from this opportunity. In addition, counter-
sanctions and Russia’s attempts at import substitution have
now led to more protectionism and less competition, and
any positive effect of WTOmembership will be frozen until
the security situation changes.
Another external factor in Russia’s economic policy is the
Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) that Russia established to-
gether with Kazakhstan and Belarus on 1 January 2010.
However, most observers seem to agree that the ECU is pri-
marily a geopolitical instrument and that it will not result
in signiﬁcant economic or institutional gains for its members
(Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013). Russia wants the ECU to
include more countries in its “near abroad”, but recruit-
ment to the union has so far produced only meager results.12
Ukraine was invited to join this union but refused in its
attempt to get an accession agreement with the EU in 2013.
With isolation from the West, the ECU has become more
important for Russia.
This program saw the whole energy industry, nuclear energy, the phar-
maceutical industry and IT as the core areas. Generally the program aimed
at improving the conditions for development – better institutions, more
investment, developed infrastructure, innovation and support to intellec-
tual achievements. Medvedev’s analysis of the situation in 2009 was in
many respects a strong criticism of the results of Putin’s previous two terms:
the economic structure was backward, corruption was out of control and
society was too paternalistic (Oxenstierna, 2009, pp. 43–45).
10 This refers particularly to companies in the defense sector that receive
substantial state support in the form of state orders, e.g. the tank and rail
car producer Uralvagonzavod.
11 These commitments include non-discriminatory treatment of imports
of goods and services, binding tariff levels, ensuring transparency when
implementing trade measures, limiting agricultural subsidies, enforcing
intellectual property rights for foreign holders of such rights, and forgo-
ing the use of local content requirements and other trade-related investment
measures (Connolly, 2013, p. 61).
12 On 1 January 2015 Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became members of the
ECU.
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4. Putin’s economic policy
On the macro level the Russian economy performed well
in the 2000s, and its ﬁscal management won praise. Eco-
nomic policy under formerMinister of Finance Alexei Kudrin
was commended for its restraint and low government debt.
The crisis management during the 2009 economic contrac-
tion resulted in Russia recovering from the crisis, and growth
in 2010 was 4.5 percent (World Bank, 2013). After Kudrin’s
resignation in September 2011 and Putin’s return as pres-
ident inMay 2012, the direction of economic policy has been
less consistent, and the idea of Russia taking its own route
with a “Russian economic model” has seriously chal-
lenged the liberal paradigm.
President Putin presented the main directions of his eco-
nomic program immediately after his inauguration in May
2012. In his ﬁrst decree, No. 596, on economic policy, Putin
(2012b) spelt out the economic improvements that should
be achieved by 2018–2020. These included: the creation of
25 million highly productive workplaces by 2020; an in-
crease in the share of investment in GDP to 27 percent in
2018; an increase of investment in state priority indus-
tries; an increase in labor productivity by a factor of 1.5;
preparations for the privatization of state assets outside the
commodity-energy sector; and an improvement of the rating
of Russia in theWorld Bank Doing Business Index from 120th
place in 2011 to 50th in 2015 and 20th in 2018.
Also, despite the Soviet experience and evidence from
other countries that high military spending does not guar-
antee high growth, the increased role of the defense industry
was stressed in Decree No. 603 and in the budget address
2012, where the defense industry is named “a driver” in eco-
nomic development (Putin, 2012a, 2012d). The government’s
economic program also stressed the technological mod-
ernization and importance of the defense industry
(Government, 2013, p. 23).
Several of Putin’s goals appeared diﬃcult to achieve even
before the sharp decline in growth in 2013. Raising the in-
vestment ratio to 27 percent would have been a diﬃcult task
even before the surge in capital ﬂight in 2013–2014. Cre-
ating 25 million highly productive workplaces would also
have be diﬃcult before the present economic stagnation
since the rent dependent companies hoard labor in order
to motivate continuous subsidies, and Russia is experienc-
ing labor shortages due to the decline in the working-age
population and the low geographical mobility of the work-
force (Oxenstierna, 2014). The labor market is tight and for
new jobs to be manned old, ineﬃcient “Soviet-type” jobs
need to be scrapped and labor motivated and helped to
move. As the reform economist Vladimir Mau (2013, p. 14)
remarked, there is no labor surplus to employ in these new
jobs. Mau also notes that a large part of the educatedmiddle
class living in the big cities is ready to leave the country.
Moreover, Russian surveys indicate that 70 percent of Rus-
sians with an income over the average want their children
to study and work abroad and over one third would prefer
their children to go abroad permanently (Mau, 2013).
The weak business climate has been a characteristic of
the Russian economy despite years of reform efforts to
improve it. Nevertheless, Russia’s ranking in theWorld Bank
Ease of Doing Business index has improved since Putin’s
Decree No. 596. In 2013 it had improved to 92nd among
189 countries (from 120th place in 2012). In 2014, Russia
had reached place 64 in the ranking and in 2015, 62 (World
Bank, 2015). The aspects in which Russia still has substan-
tial disadvantages are “getting electricity”, “obtaining
construction permits” and “trading across borders”. More-
over, between 2014 and 2015 the rank of the indicator
“getting credits” has deteriorated. The economy did notmeet
Putin’s goal of being ranked 50th in the world in 2015, but
nevertheless there is a substantial improvement. This index
reﬂects performance with respect to six different indica-
tors, and it does not capture the balance between old, large
enterprises with political inﬂuence existing outside market
competition and small and medium-sized ﬁrms strug-
gling to stay in business and expand. But it is worth noting
that with respect to the business climate Russia has taken
some steps in the right direction, although the credit crunch
will probably stay for the foreseeable future.
5. Economic policy and the development of defense
spending since 2013
In 2013, Russian growth plummeted to 1.3 percent a year
instead of the 2–3 percent forecast. The conﬁdence crisis
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and
its continuing aggression against Ukraine lowered growth
expectations, and in October the IMF (2014) revised its fore-
cast to 0.2 percent growth for 2014, 0.5 percent for 2015
and a recovery to 1.5 percent only in 2016. In January 2015,
however, the preliminary result for 2014 was 0.6 percent
growth, and the IMF (2015) now projected a contraction of
−3 percent for 2015 and −1 percent for 2016. Ongoing
Western sanctions, Russian counter-sanctions and the dra-
matic fall in the oil price had added to the negative trend
(Fig. 2).
In the initial three-year budget for 2014–2016 there was
an aim to reduce the federal budget as a share of GDP from
20 to 18 percent by 2016 (Oxenstierna, 2013, pp. 115–116).
Social policy expenditure, which has had high priority since
2009, was to fall from 6 to below 5 percent of GDP. The
shares of education and health were also to decline. Defense
spending remained at a high level and was planned to rise
from 3.1 percent of GDP in 2013 to 3.8 percent by 2016.
Fiscal policy during 2013 remained restrained and actual
budget expenditures were slightly lower than approved
(Oxenstierna, 2013). Table 3 shows the actual federal budget
shares for 2012–2014 and here the austerity in 2013 is re-
ﬂected: the federal budget’s share in GDP dropped to 19.8
percent. However, in 2014 the share increased again to 20.9
percent, and in the amendments to the federal budget the
aim of reducing the federal budget has been dropped and
a share of 20.8 percent is expected for 2015. The share of
national defense rose from 2.9 percent in 2012 to 3.1 in 2013
and to 3.5 percent in 2014. For 2015, the budget law implies
4.2 percent and the new proposal 4.3 percent (Table 3). As
seen in Tables 3 and 4, forecast GDP in 2015 is much lower
in the new proposal: the estimate is almost 6 percent under
that in the budget law (Table 4).
The budget for 2015–2017 was adopted by the Duma in
November 2014. The Ministry of Finance had opted for a
minimal budget deﬁcit of under 1 percent, and ﬁerce
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discussions had accompanied the budget process in the gov-
ernment on where the cuts should be made, and not least
on how far defense spending could be preserved at high
levels when other public spending had to be reduced. In
October, Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov (Reuter, 2014)
signaled that a new defense program needed to be devel-
oped that took into account the changed economic situation,
even though the deputy prime minister in charge of the
sector had been ruling out any cuts in military spending.13
This was an echo of his veteran predecessor, Alexei Kudrin,
who quit in protest when the rise in military spending was
initially proposed under President Medvedev in Septem-
ber 2011. At that time, however, the funding of the military
reform and the rearmament programwere based on the as-
sumption that Russia would maintain its unprecedentedly
high growth rate, of 6 percent per year, throughout the
decade. Now times had changed and Siluanov stated quite
bluntly, “Right now, we just cannot afford it” (Reuter, 2014).
The lower growth due to the dip in oil prices, the halving
of the value of the ruble against the US dollar, and the
Western sanctions14 impeding Russian banks’ free access to
Western capital markets and restricting exports of ad-
vanced technology to Russia, had clearly shattered the hopes
of the Minister of Finance for a quick recovery.13 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin had previously said that mod-
ernization of the military would continue as envisaged by Putin’s initial
decrees (Putin, 2012a, 2012c). In an interview for the daily Kommersant
newspaper, Rogozin had insisted that “The idea is that by 2015 we should
have upgraded 30 percent of military equipment, and by 2020 70 percent”.
He also claimed that state defense orders could not be transferred “blindly”
at the whim of the Finance Ministry – at least not without revising the
presidential decrees – and that neither the program nor the funds allo-
cated for it is subject to revision (Reuter, 2014).
14 One of the more spectacular consequences of the sanctions is that on
25 November 2014, France announced that it had suspended indeﬁ-
nitely the delivery of the ﬁrst of twoMistral-class amphibious assault ships,
which is part of an EUR 1.2 billion agreement between France and Russia
signed in 2011 (BBC, 2014).
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Fig. 2. Economic growth 2000–2019. Source: IMF (2014, 2015).
Table 3
Federal budget items as shares of GDP in 2012–2015; percentage of GDP.
2012
Actual
2013
Actual
2014
Actual
2015
FZ-384
2015 New
proposal
Federal budget as % of GDP 20.6 19.8 20.9 20.0 20.8
General state issues 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5
National defense 2.9 3.1 3.5 4.2 4.3
National security and legal 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8
Support to the economy 3.1 2.7 4.3 3.0 2.9
Housing and utilities 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Environment protection 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Education 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
Culture 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Health 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5
Social policy 6.2 5.7 4.9 5.2 5.8
Physical culture and sport 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Media 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Debt service (state and municipal) 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.8
Interbudgetary transfers 1.0 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.8
Deﬁcit/surplus −0.1 −0.8 0.5 −0.6 −3.7
GDP billion RUR 62 599 67 519 70 976 77 499 73 119
Source: Federal Treasury (2013) – data for 2102 and 2013; Ministry of Finance RF (2015a, p. 8; 2015b) – data for 2014 and 2015.
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The discussion continued into 2015 and the Ministry of
Finance worked on amendments with budget cuts of up to
10 percent. Different proposals ﬂourished: in some defense
spending was to be sheltered, in others not. In the original
budget for 2015 the oil price was set at USD 100/bbl. With
the oil price going under USD 50/bbl in January 2015, Janes
(2015) reported that Russian defense expenditure would be
reduced by 10 percent from its intended level in 2015 in
the attempt to reduce overall state spending, according to
government oﬃcials. According to a statement of Deputy
DefenseMinister Tatyana Shevtsova on 28 January, however,
the new measures would not be applied to the state arma-
ment program (Janes, 2015). Bearing in mind that Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu had announced a quite substantial
reduction of the funding of the next GPV (for 2015–2025)
in December 2014, it seemed unlikely that the GPV 2020
plans would be untouched by the budget cuts.15
Finally, Putin signed a law that would allow the govern-
ment to ﬁnance the budget deﬁcit out of the Reserve Fund
in 2015. This is the ﬁrst time this fund would be used since
the global ﬁnancial crisis (Reuter, 2015). With this backing,
the Ministry of Finance could amend the budget and submit
a new proposal to the Duma. Table 4 compares the exist-
ing budget law (FZ-384) with the new proposed budget. As
can be seen, the defense budget has been cut not by 10
percent as envisaged by some observers in January, but by
almost 5 percent in nominal terms compared to the orig-
inal FZ-384. National security –much less discussed but also
an item that has had high priority and grown during the
Putin era – also sees reductions. Support for the national
economy is cut by 8.8 percent in nominal terms, which is
quite courageous of the government considering the diﬃ-
culties Russian companies are experiencing under present
circumstances. Furthermore, spending onmany of the items
that affect the population most, such as the health sector,
protection of the environment, education and culture, has
been reduced and it may be interesting to see if this has
any effect on public opinion. Nevertheless, social policy
has got increased funding compared to the old budget, which
may be needed when the economy contracts.
6. Conclusions
For a decade Russia’s geopolitical ambitions have been
reﬂected in increased defense spending. However, the failure
to modernize the economy and make it less dependent on
hydrocarbons andmore innovative led to weak growth after
2009, whichmeans that rising defense spending has become
more costly to the economy. With the addition of the con-
ﬁdence crisis resulting from the aggression against Ukraine
in 2014, the resulting capital ﬂight and the expected con-
traction of the economy in 2015, the preconditions for
further growth of military and other public spending have
changed dramatically.
From the study of the federal budget share of defense
it is evident that defense still has high priority in terms of
a rising share of GDP. Yet defense spending has been reduced
in light of the deteriorating economic situation in 2015. Thus
there is still a trade-off between defense and other spend-
ing in the budget, even though it is evident that other items
are being reduced signiﬁcantly, such as health services,
support to the economy and environmental protection.
RussianMinister of Finance Anton Siluanov has argued since
the fall of 2014 that defense spendingmust be reduced since
at the moment Russia cannot afford this spending and
that a new, more realistic defense program had to be
15 The cost of the state armament program up to the year 2025 would
drop from RUR 55 trillion to 30 trillion through the development of stra-
tegic weapons and equipment types with similar characteristics, Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu said on 19 December 2014 at the enlarged colle-
gium session of the military. “The work has been completed on a type of
perspective samples of weapons and equipment, have similar features and
speciﬁcations. This will reduce the cost of the GPV up to 2025, with 55
trillion to 30 trillion rubles, while maintaining the necessary amount of
equipment”, the report said (Global Security, 2014).
Table 4
Federal budgets 2014 and 2015 and proposed change in 2015; million RUR and percent.
2014 Actual 2015 Budget
law FZ-384
2015
Proposed
change
2015 New
budget
proposal
Change% from
FZ-384 to new
proposal
Total spending 14 830 601 15 513 079 –298 035 15 215 045 –1.9
State administration 934 741 1 113 735 –33 669 1 080 066 –3.0
National defense 2 479 074 3 273 991 –157 218 3 116 774 –4.8
National security and legal system 2 086 165 2 148 072 –80 423 2 067 649 –3.7
National economy 3 062 915 2 338 749 –205 897 2 132 852 –8.8
Housing and municipal services 119 609 144 606 –15 603 129 003 –10.8
Environmental protection 46 366 54 947 –8 868 46 079 –16.1
Education 638 265 632 976 –30 867 602 108 –4.9
Culture 97 832 99 008 –7 115 91 893 –7.2
Health 535 564 420 940 –34 730 386 210 –8.3
Social policy 3 452 374 4 010 082 203 639 4 213 721 5.1
Physical culture and sports 71 164 73 662 –1 818 71 844 –2.5
Media 74 832 69 971 2 152 72 124 3.1
Debt service 415 612 449 304 135 996 585 299 30.3
Transfers between budgets 816 090 683 037 –63 614 619 423 –9.3
Deﬁcit –431 –2 245 –2 673
GDP billion RUR 70 976 77 499 –4 380 73 119 –5.7
Source: Ministry of Finance RF (2015a, p. 8; 2015b).
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developed. Even though the cut in the defense budget has
been less than foreseen by the Ministry of Finance, the
budget item has been cut by almost 5 percent nominally
compared to the November budget. How this will affect the
building up of military capability in terms of the arma-
ment program and personnel needs to be the subject of a
separate study, but we already know that the funding of the
new armament program up to 2025 was reduced consid-
erably during the fall of 2014.
The amendments to the federal budget law 2015 imply
a higher budget deﬁcit than originally planned and that the
government will use the Reserve Fund to ﬁnance it. This
means that about USD 50 billion will be drawn from the
Reserve Fund, which corresponds to about 60 percent of the
whole fund. This reduces Russia’s ﬁscal maneuvering room
for future years if the economy does not recover or Western
ﬁnancial markets do not open up for Russian state banks.
This study of Russian military expenditure has shown
that defense spending as a share of GDP is still on a rising
trend, but cuts have been made to it at a time of great
economic distress. It follows that defense spending is still
high, but it does not have absolute priority and there is
still a trade-off between defense and other public spend-
ing. However, Russia will have trouble restoring growth and
keeping up its military ambitions as long as the economic
system is not reformed and productive private economic
actors cannot grow. Some improvement has been achieved
regarding the business climate in recent years, but the rent
management system and the continued maintenance of
“Soviet style” producers – “addicts” – in exchange for po-
litical support have not been addressed. Rent addiction and
the rent management system hinder a thorough institu-
tional reform that could establish “rule of law” and
“voice and accountability”, which are two of several im-
portant institutional conditions for a healthy economic
development.
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